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THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT NEEDS, DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES AND NETWORK-
STRUCTURES ON INVESTOR BEHAVIOR AND 
STOCK MARKET DYNAMICS: A SIMULATION 
APPROACH  
Arvid O. I. Hoffmann and Wander Jager 
 
SOM-theme B: Innovation and interaction 
 Abstract 
Striking investor and stock market behaviour have been recurrent items in the worldwide press 
for the recent past. Crashes and hypes like the Internet bubble are often hard to explain using 
existing finance frameworks. Therefore, the authors provide a complementing multi-
theoretical framework that is built on existing finance research to describe and explain 
investor’s behaviour and stock market dynamics. This framework is built on three main 
components: needs, decision making theory, and (social) network effects. This framework will 
be used to build a future simulation model of investor behaviour and to generate stock market 
dynamics. A brief outline of the design of these simulation experiments will be given.  
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Worldwide financial markets have hit the news in the recent past numerous times due 
to striking behavior of both (individual) investors active on these markets as well as 
due to the (sometimes awkward) market developments that resulted from aggregate 
investor behavior. The two most obvious examples of the last 2 decades are perhaps 
the stock market crash of 1987 and the Internet bubble of the late nineties of the 
former century. Both examples will be shortly discussed hereafter.  
On Monday the 19th October of 1987, The US stock markets lost to 23% of their 
value in just one day. Since then, there has been no satisfying explanation why the 
crash took place on exactly this date, why it occurred so quickly and was played out 
in one day, why the markets fell so much, why the crash was not merely American, 
but worldwide and why there were no significant news items or events preceding the 
crash. Although standard explanations like program trading, overvaluation, events 
and illiquidity could explain some of the questions mentioned above, none could 
explain them all. However, the authors expect processes of social interaction and 
social influence among investors to play an important role in this phenomenon and to 
be key to a better understanding of this crash. 
The Internet bubble is the other example of recent deviant investor and market 
behavior. In the late nineties of the last century, stock prices of companies related to 
the Internet or Communication Technology business rose dramatically over very short 
time spans. Price rises of over 100% in just a few days were no exception. Even the 
mere announcement of a name change of a company in a name that suggested some 
connection with the Internet could already cause significant increases in stock prices 
of these companies (Cooper et al., 2001).  Then, after more than a year of rapidly 
increasing stock prices, the Internet bubble bursted and prices of Internet and 
Communication Technology related stocks settled at a much lower level. Just as with 
the preceding example, the authors expect processes of social interaction and social 
influence to be of importance for a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon. 
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Moreover, investor needs; e.g., the need for belonginess or participation, are expected 
to play an important role.  
 
Our contribution to resolving this puzzle is the development of a behavioral theoretic 
framework that integrates perspectives from both finance theory, perspectives from 
decision-making theory as well as social network theory in a sequential way. We 
argue, that it is necessary to include (psychological, social psychological and 
sociological) theories on needs, social interaction and network structures in current 
finance theory to come to a framework that leads to a better understanding and 
explanation of investor and stock market behavior. The objective is to identify critical 
micro level factors (e.g., personal needs, social interaction) that drive investor’s 
behavior and to explain macro level phenomena (e.g., bubbles and crashes), which 
may be the result of aggregate investor behavior. The link between the micro level 
and the macro level is an explicit objective of our study and an important contribution 
to the field. To be clear, it is not our objective to replace existing finance theories. 
The goal is to build on, complement and refine these theories in order to offer a 
complementing framework. This need is widely acknowledged among finance 
theorists. (De Bondt and Thaler, 1994; Statman, 1996; Olsen, 1998; Thaler, 2000; 
Ritter, 2003). 
 
The proposed framework will first be tested on a micro level using questionnaires and 
in-depth interviews that will be held among Dutch investors. When necessary, the 
framework will be adapted after the first empirical data are processed. Then we will 
proceed, using a multi-agent computer simulation method. Using this method it is 
possible to study the effect of changing assumptions on micro level investor behavior 
on macro level stock market dynamics. Based on the knowledge gained through first 
empirical studies, we will formalize the influence of multiple needs, social interaction 
and network effects on the trading behavior of investors into a multi agent computer 
simulation model. Here the data obtained from the field study will be used in the 
parameterization of the agent characteristics. A large number of agents will be used as 
well as a significant number of different stocks. As institutional/ professional 
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investors cause a major part of the stock turnover, a number of 
institutional/professional agents should be included as well. Sensitivity analysis will 
provide information on the sensitivity of the market dynamics for (1) heterogeneity 
concerning the weight of different needs, thus allowing to test if small proportions of 
investors weighting social needs do affect the market as a whole, (2) heterogeneity of 
agents concerning their sensitivity for uncertainty and hence their inclination to use 
social heuristics, and (3) the shape and size of agents networks. These simulation-
generated dynamics will then be compared with empirical data on stock market 
dynamics. Both the effect of varying the discussed micro level factors on the behavior 
of investors and the resulting macro level phenomena are topic of investigation; i.e. 
there will be a coupling of micro level data to macro level data. 
 
The use of computer-simulated markets with individual adaptive agents is a relatively 
new method in finance (LeBaron, 2000). The simulation models that were developed 
the last decade range from very simple models like that of Lettau (1997) and Gode 
and Sunder (1993) to very complex models like the Santa Fe artificial stock market 
developed by Arthur et al. (1997). Examples of models of intermediate complexity 
are those by Arifovic (1996), Routledge (1994) and Beltratti and Margarita (1992). 
Many other models of artificial stock markets exist (for an overview see e.g., 
LeBaron, 2000). Many of these markets are based on research that distinguishes 
several kinds of traders (e.g., information traders versus noise traders) and observe the 
market dynamics after they are put together (e.g., Chiarella, 1992; Day and Huang, 
1990). At this moment, there is no simulation model that incorporates all the building 
blocks of our theoretical framework.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, our theoretical 
framework is presented. Section three deals with the question how to formalize our 
framework in a simulation model. Section four gives an outline of the integration of 
existing simulation models we will use and will briefly describe the first simulation 
that is planned. The paper ends with a conclusion. 
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2 An integrated framework on investor behavior 
In this section we will introduce an alternative framework of investor behavior. This 
framework is built on three main components. These are needs, decision-making 





Stocks are traditionally merely associated with the need for financial gains. Although 
these financial gains may be used to satisfy many different needs (e.g., the need for 
protection may be satisfied by buying a house, the need for subsistence may be 
satisfied by buying food), the concept of a single need is by itself quite limited. 
According to the authors, the act of investing should be studied in a broader 
perspective of needs.  
Much research has been performed on human needs (see e.g., Maslow, 1954; 
Kamenetzky, 1992 and Max-Neef, 1992). In our framework we choose the needs 
taxonomy of Max-Neef (1992) as a starting point. The reason for this choice is the 
level of elaboration of this taxonomy (i.e. it consists of nine different, mutually not-
excluding needs, it makes a distinction into needs and satisfiers and it is empirically 
grounded).  
The taxonomy of Max-Neef consists of the following nine needs: 
 
• Subsistence. This need is a very basic one and in fact it aims at staying alive. 
• Protection. People need protection. This can range from protection from the 
weather (by e.g., a house) to protection of their income at old age (by e.g., 
combining social security, savings and investing).  
• Affection. People want to be appreciated and loved by others. 
• Understanding. People want to learn new things and develop themselves by 
studying.  
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• Participation. People want to be a part of something larger than themselves. 
They want to share and interact. 
• Leisure. People want to spend their free time in a meaningful and fulfilling 
way and want to have fun.  
• Creation. People like making and creating new things. They are curious for 
inventions. 
• Identity. People like integrating themselves and to feel a sense of belonging 
(or also to distinguish themselves from others). This need has a large social 
element. 
• Freedom. People want to have equal rights and to be free to do what they like 
to do. 
 
So, the financial benefits harvested from investing may serve to satisfy needs such as 
subsistence (by buying groceries), protection (by buying a house) and leisure 
(financing a holiday). However, the act of investing as such may also have non-
financial mediated effects on needs. People also may trade for reasons of excitement 
(leisure) and/or to comply with the behavior of friends (belongingness). Also, some 
stocks will be bought because one identifies him/herself with the company in 
question. For example, in the Netherlands many AJAX fans bought shares of this 
Dutch football club when it issued them in an IPO (Initial Public Offering). It is hard 
to believe that these investors (only) used a risk/return calculation to come to the 
decision of investing in “their club”. It is far more plausible to assume that these 
investors (also) tried to satisfy their need for identification with this particular football 
club by buying these shares. Also for other kind of stocks this reasoning seems 
appropriate (e.g., for Internet and Communication Technology related stocks). People 
may even trade stocks to satisfy a need for leisure. For example, private investors 
sometimes join investor associations to spend their free time in a meaningful way and 
to have fun. Becker (1991) and Hong et al. (2001) confirm that investors may enjoy 
talking about stock markets with relevant others (e.g., friends, colleagues, etc). 
 




Decision-making can be either more individual based or more social based. A 
representative example of a more individual based model1 of decision-making is the 
rational model of decision-making as put forth by e.g., Simon (1947). This kind of 
models focus’ the decision makers attention on the different steps in a decision-
process that have to be followed to come to a decision. They make sure that no 
important point is missed or that preliminary conclusions are being drawn. In general, 
these models consist of three main parts: intelligence, design and choice.  
However, when socially oriented needs become important for the investor, more 
social interaction is likely to take place and more social information will be used in 
the decision-making process. Social interaction and the use of social information may 
take the form of heuristics that use social information that guide investors in making 
their decisions. In general, heuristics are composed from building blocks that guide 
search, stop search and help to make decisions. The distinctive characteristics of 
heuristics are that they are fast and frugal. Fast refers to the relative ease of 
computation of these strategies. Frugal refers to the very limited amount of 
information that these strategies need (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001).   
In general, the use of social heuristics like imitation and social comparison is driven 
by two motives. First, in situations of uncertainty these strategies may be both 
effective (i.e. lead to ‘good’ decisions) and efficient (i.e. need little time and cognitive 
processing). Second, these strategies can satisfy one’s social needs, like the need to 
participate. Both situations are likely in an investment setting with private investors, 
as will be argued in the next sections. It seems likely that investors use different parts 
of their social network in either of these instances (i.e. using social heuristics to assist 
decision-making under uncertainty versus using social heuristics to satisfy their social 
                                                     
1
 The reader should note that these models (e.g., Simon, 1947) do not rule out social influence. 
These influences may for example come to the fore in the design stage, where social 
interaction may help to generate alternatives. Social influence is however no integrated parts 
of the model as such, in contrast to for example the EBM model of consumer behaviour by 
Engel et al. (1993).  
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needs). We will come back to this in the section on social networks. First the role of 




Generally, the less information one has with respect to a decision problem, or the 
more complex and contradictory this information seems, the more uncertain a person 
becomes.2 When the level of uncertainty rises, it becomes more likely that a person 
demonstrates social processing (Festinger, 1954; Bala and Goyal, 1998). This means 
that this person uses social interaction and social information to help him or her to 
arrive at a decision. We expect an important role for social comparison and social 
interaction in the decision making process of private investors. After all, the stock 
markets are known for their sudden developments and a high degree of information 
asymmetry between actors (e.g., one investor may be a true finance expert while 
another is a starting investor). These characteristics of the stock market, coupled with 
the facts that stocks are intangible and provide no guarantees (although it may be 
possible to create these by options) and the various types of stocks, create a potential 
high level of uncertainty for an investor. This situation of uncertainty increases the 
likelihood of processes of social comparison and social interaction to take place in 
these kinds of markets. For this reason one can expect an increased use of social 




When social needs gain importance for investors, the concept of social rationality 
comes to the fore. Social needs like the need for participation and affection introduce 
social goals besides the financial goals of investing. In these cases social rationality is 
the relevant type of rationality besides more traditional (i.e. financial) notions of 
                                                     
2
 The reviewer brought to our attention the possibility of a situation of abundant information, 
which may lead to an opaque decision environment and therefore an increased level of 
uncertainty. Especially in the stock markets this situation seems likely.  
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rationality. These social goals contain accountability (i.e. making decisions that can 
be justified and defended (Tetlock, 1983)), transparency (i.e. making decisions that 
are understandable and predictable by the group with which one associates) and 
fairness (i.e. making decisions that don’t violate the expectations that are in force 
between people of equal social standing) (Gigerenzer, 2001). Social imitation as a 
heuristic helps the decision maker in situations of limited time and knowledge to 
come to decisions. Social norms may play a similar role. Particular in the domain of 
social rationality these heuristics are important and of value in addition to the 
cognitive building blocks identified before (i.e. searching rules, stopping rules and 
decision rules). The concept of social rationality is useful in an investment setting, as 
it is likely that to many people it is important to make accountable, fair and 
transparent investment decisions.  
 
In current financial theories, however, no framework is developed in which processes 
of social comparison and social interaction are seen as regular parts of investors’ 
decision making, although the occurrence and benefits from this kind of behavior in 
an investment setting are slowly being acknowledged (see e.g., Shiller and Pound, 
1989; Orléan, 1989; Fung and Hsieh, 1999; Kelly and O’Grada, 2000; Hong et al., 
2001 and Hirschleifer and Teoh, 2003).  
However, before any product or decision can become socially relevant, it should be 
visible (i.e. other people should be sensorial (e.g., see, hear, etc.) informed about the 
decisions you have made). Other people (e.g., in your social network) should be able 
to see what decision(s) you have made (e.g., buying shares of Unilever, Royal Dutch, 
etc.) Although in general one could argue that stocks are not very visible in a strict 
visual sense (e.g., compared to for example a car) discussing about stocks at parties 
and joining investor associations may increase this visibility. The information 
diffusion characteristics of social networks may further support these processes by 







Before people can trade using information gathered from people they know, like 
friends and colleagues, they should interact to become aware of this information and 
to get this information. This information is being spread through networks, 
connecting friends with friends from friends and so forth (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; 
Watts, 2001, Janssen and Jager, 2003). Recent research demonstrated that many large 
networks display a scale-free power-law distribution for node connectivity (Barabasi 
& Albert, 1999). In terms of market dynamics this may imply that a small proportion 
of investors having a lot of contacts (so-called ‘hubs’) may have an exceptional 
influence on the investing behavior of others. We expect these hubs to differ in 
certain characteristics (e.g., uncertainty, status) compared to non-hubs. In the context 
of markets, much attention has been focused at networks between “buyers” and 
“sellers” (e.g., Ford, 1997). This approach contributed to the understanding of certain 
empirical phenomena, which could not be explained by assuming markets to consist 
of unstructured aggregations of individuals (e.g., Wellman & Berkowitz, 1997: 221).  
However, whereas many studies focused on the role of social networks in buyer-seller 
relationships, hardly any tried to reveal how consumer networks, such as assumed 
between (private) investors, affect market dynamics. In the stock markets, finance 
experts or “gurus” may act as connectors and hubs. Having a lot of contacts and 
expertise at the same time they could have an important influence on the behavior of 
other investors and an exceptional influence on stock-market dynamics. Lohse (1998) 
and Hirschleifer and Teoh (2003) illustrate the possible influence of hubs in the stock 
markets by discussing the endorsement effect of so-called ‘anchors’ in the stock 
market. In the preceding sections we discussed the two main reasons for using social 
interaction and social information in investment decision-making. The main 
difference between the two is that one is more informative oriented, while the other is 
more normative oriented. The informative part will be discussed first.  
First, social networks can support an investor’s decision-making when he or she is 
uncertain about what decision to make. This is the informative function of the social 
network. Information about the actions and beliefs of other (comparable) investors in 
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one’s social network can assist the investor in his or her decision-making. In this case, 
it seems likely that an investor socially compares with or imitates another investor 
with a good reputation (who preferable has a comparable risk preference, income and 
investment time horizon). Following the behaviour of a finance expert seems more 
likely to lead to good investments than following the advice of an arbitrary neighbor 
or friend (assuming these people are no finance experts).  
Second, the use of social heuristics can lead to the satisfaction of social needs of an 
investor. This is the normative influence of a social network. For example, to satisfy 
the need to belong to a group, one may purchase stocks that are popular among 
friends, colleagues or whatever reference group one has. It is likely that these friends 
and colleagues constitute a different part of someone’s social network than the before 
mentioned finance experts.  
So, we expect that different parts of investors’ social networks are used to achieve 
different objectives (e.g., supporting decision-making under uncertainty or satisfying 
social needs) and that different information is transmitted between the persons in 
these different parts of the social network. 
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3 Formalizing the framework 
The assumptions of our theoretical framework will be used in building a multi-agent 
simulation model. This model should be able to incorporate the effect of varying 
levels of social versus individual needs and of varying levels of uncertainty on the 
behavior of investors and on the resulting stock market dynamics (e.g., price 
fluctuations, herding behavior, social comparison behavior). The model should have 
the possibility to vary the numbers of different types of investors (e.g., institutional 
investors as well as individual investors) and to observe the effect on investors’ 
decision-making and stock market (price) dynamics. It should be possible to study the 
effect of varying social network structures (e.g., regular grid, random and scale free 
networks) on the behavior of investors as well as on the stock market dynamics. 
Furthermore, the model should include the possibility to generate longitudinal data.  
The above-mentioned requirements are quite demanding. However, the authors 
already have a multi-agent simulation model at their disposal that is based on the 
consumat approach. The consumat approach (Jager, Janssen & Vlek, 1999; Jager, 
2000) provides a tool that allows one to formalize needs and different decision 
processes in artificial agents. Therefore, it is capable of formalizing social needs and 
social decision processes in a multi-agent computer simulation. The consumat 
approach is based on a more psychological based meta-theory of human decision-
making than the frequently used ‘rational actor’ approach. In the consumat approach, 
basic human needs and uncertainty are regarded to be the driving factors behind 
human decision-making processes. The approach even allows for modeling different 
network-structures, and has been used to study market dynamics (Janssen & Jager, 
2001, 2003).  
 
More formally, there is a population of N agents where each period the agents make a 
choice which of M products to consume. The agents are connected with, on average, k 
other agents. These connected agents are called friends. Products are assumed to 
differ from each other in a dimension d, which is defined for a range from 0 to 1. The 
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utility of using a product consists of two parts; both an individual part and a social 
effect part. The individual part expresses the difference between personal preferences 
of a consumer for each product and the product dimension. The preference for 
product i, pi, is expressed by a value between 0 and 1. The utility for the product, 
based on personal preferences alone, is equal to one minus the absolute difference 
between personal preference pi and product dimension di. The social effect holds that 
if more friends consume the same product, the utility of the product increases. The 
variable xj denotes the fraction of i ‘s friends who also consume product j. The total 
expected utility of consuming product j is equal to: 
 
• E [Uij] = (1 – i) (1- | dj – pi| ) + i  xj   
 
The components of the utility function, the individual part and the social part, are 
weighted with 1- i and i. A low i holds that personal needs are weighted more, 
  	 i holds that the social needs are weighted more. Prices are not 
explicitly included in the model. However, the dimension dj on which the agents 
make decisions may include price related information. So, at two levels there is an 
introduction of heterogeneity in the utility function of the agents. First, there exist 
individual variations considering personal preferences regarding the product 
characteristics, the value of pi. Second, it resides in different weights of the personal 
need against the social need, the value of i
         
decision-makers social susceptibility.  
 
Although the explicit formalization of the consumat approach is not directly 
translatable to an investment setting, the approach as such has many strong points 
(e.g., the possibility to vary the extent of social susceptibility of decision makers, the 
option of using different networks of decision-makers and most importantly the 
strong base of the approach in theories on human decision-making). The approach fits 
well with our framework, which is also based on theories of human decision-making. 
For our current aims however, the approach still has two limitations. First, the 
approach does not include prices of the products. Second, the approach is able to 
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generate ‘hypes’ and ‘crashes’ of products, but is unable to generate more complex 
volatility, as it is often seen in the stock markets. We believe that introducing a price 
mechanism will solve both problems. We intend to achieve this by incorporating 
critical parts of the consumat approach into an established simulation model 
originating from finance.  
A number of agent-based simulation models exist in finance, reaching from very 
simple to highly complex models (see e.g., Bray, 1982; Grossmann and Stiglitz, 1980; 
Kareken and Wallace, 1981; Day and Huang, 1990; Chiarella, 1992; Gode and 
Sunder, 1993; Routledge, 1994; Arifovic, 1996; Arthur et al., 1997; Lettau, 1997; 
LeBaron, 2000). The authors are basically interested in the effects of including social 
needs, social interaction and network effects in finance models on the trading 
behavior of investors, price dynamics as well as in any possible interaction effects 
between the foregoing (e.g., the effect of severe price volatility on investors’ trading 
behavior). Therefore, and because we already have a multi-agent simulation model at 
our disposal, the finance-based simulation model that is added to our approach should 
be an accepted, simple, although realistic, model. For these reasons, we decided to 
use the model by Day and Huang (1990) that they present in their often cited (44 
times3) paper “Bulls, Bears and Market Sheep” as a starting point in our analyses.  
                                                     
3
 See e.g., http://isi4.isiknowledge.com/portal.cgi?DestApp=WOS&Func=Frame 
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4 Integrating multi-agent simulation models 
In this section we will first discuss the model by Day and Huang (1990) that we will 
use in our future simulations and then discuss the design of these future simulations. 
 
4.1 The model of Day and Huang 
 
Day and Huang (1990: 299-300) start their argument by posing the following 
question: 
 
“…Is it possible that observable features of stock market prices, such as their 
unpredictable, fluctuating nature and their tendency to generate alternating periods of 
generally rising or generally falling prices, so-called “bull” and “bear” markets that 
seem suddenly to switch from one to the other at irregular intervals, are derivable 
from the way market participants behave?”  
 
According to Day and Huang (1990), this first question is in contrast to conventional 
arguments, which state that opportunistic trading by rational investors will arbitrage 
away any possible gain from predictable stock market patterns, so that any movement 
in stock prices is caused by more-or-less random news. However, it matches very 
well our framework, which expects that psychologically and socially based market 
behavior of (networks of) investors cause stock market dynamics. More generally, 
other authors admit that psychological forces are in play at instances of striking stock 
market dynamics (see e.g., Shiller, 1987 and Smith et al., 1988). Day and Huang build 
a model of excess demand and price adjustment that is “just sufficient” to answer the 
above-mentioned question (Day and Huang, 1990: 300).  
 
The model contains three types of market participants: -investors, -investors and 
the market maker. We will briefly describe here the market behavior of these three 
 15





 -investor uses a strategy based on an independent, sophisticated estimate of the 
long run investment value u in relation to the current market price p and on an 
estimate of the probability of capital gains and capital losses. The investment value u 
is the -investors’ best estimate of the price if anticipated long run economic 
conditions actually came to dominate the future. It is based on e.g., statistical analyses 
of trends in aggregate economic variables and individual company performances. 
These quantitative estimates are then adjusted with the help of ‘soft’ judgments based 
on e.g., journals, papers, magazines and direct company observations. The properties 
of -investors demand function are so that:  
 
• when p is below u, investors are net buyers of shares, 
• when p is above u they are net sellers of shares, 
• and when p is equal to u investors hold their current stocks, i.e. there is no 
excess demand. 
 
The bel   -investor can be compared to the beliefs of the investor in the 
model of investor sentiment by Barberis, Shleifer et al. (1998) in the situation when 
the investor beliefs the world to be governed by regime 1. In regime 1, earnings are 
determined by model 1, which holds that earnings are mean reverting. In the model of 
Day and Huang (1990), the -investor sells if the price reaches a level above the long 
run investment value and buys when the price reaches a level below the long run 
in
 -investor has the belief that prices revert back to 
the long run investment value (i.e. the “mean” in Barberis, Schleifer et al. (1998)).   
 
More formally, the excess demand func -investor is: 
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This function is bounded on an estimated topping price M and an estimated bottoming 
price m. The assumptions of Day and Huang with regard to the effect of M and m are: 
 
• If p < m, investors will have bought in already, then no excess demand 
 
• If p> M, investors will have sold out already, then no excess demand 
 
The positive parameter ‘a’ is a measure of the strength of investor demand. It reflects 
the fact expressed by Black (1986) that the farther the price of a stock is from its long 
run investment value, the more aggressive the information traders become.  
 
f (p) is a weighting function that represents the chance of lost opportunity caused by 
either failing to buy when the market is low or failing to sell when the market is high. 
When p is close to m, the chance of missing a capital gain by failing to buy is great, 
when p is close to M, the chance of losing a capital gain and experiencing a capital 
loss by failing to sell is great as well. When p is close to u, the perceived chance of 
capital gain or capital loss is small or zero. So, f (.) is bimodal with modes near or at 
m and M.  Formally: 
 
• f (.) is non-negative, differentiable and bounded on [m, M].  
 
• f’ (p) < 0 for m < p < u  
 
• f’ (u) = 0  
 





The -investors, similar to Blacks’ (1986) ‘noise traders’ do not pursue the same 
sophisticated techniques as the -investors, as this trading is expensive: it takes a lot 
of time, costly information and a substantial investment in intellectual and 
computational capital. Most market participants therefore cannot afford to pursue this 
kind of behavior and accordingly they don’t (Day and Huang, 1990).  -investors 
make their decisions using a simple comparison between the current price p and the 
current fundamental value, v. In the model of Day and Huang (1990), the value of v is 
given. The authors do not mention the way v is calculated. These  -investors believe 
that the market will go up when the current price is above the fundamental value and 
that the market will go down when the current price is below the fundamental value. 
This is a sharp contrast to the -investors. The -investors have a demand function so 
that: 
 
• when p is above v they are net buyers, 
• when p is below v they are net sellers, 
• and when p is v they hold.  
 
    -investor can be compared to the beliefs of the investor in the 
model of investor sentiment by Barberis, Shleifer et al. (1998) in the situation when 
the investor beliefs the world to be governed by regime 2. In regime 2, earnings are 
determined by model 2, in which earnings are trending. In Day and Huang (1990), the 
-investor is buying when the price is above the current fundamental value and sells 
when the price is below current fundamental value (i.e. the investor thinks prices are 
trending).  
 
   $ %%   -investors (after some 
simplifications) is: 
 
• – v) 
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      -investors and the strength of 
their response to price signals.  
The market maker 
 
The third participant in the market is the market maker. This party is a mediator 
between transactions on the market and sets a price according to the total excess 
demand or total excess supply there is in the market and at this price supplies excess 
demand from his or her inventory of stocks or increases his or her inventory of stocks 
in case there is an excess supply.  
 
More formally, the total excess demand E is: 
 
• & '  
 
If V t is the market makers inventory of stocks at the time he or she announces the 
price, then the change in inventory is:  
 
• V t + 1 – V t = E (pt) 
 
The price change p
 t + 1 – p t is determined by a continuous, monotonically increasing 
 &  !!%(oefficient and  
p
 t + 1   t): = p t' & t)].  
 
)*%+	 &  & 
 
• P
 t + 1 t): = p t + cE (p t) 
 
Initially, the value of the parameter c is set to 1 in Day and Huang (1990) 
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The model of Day and Huang (1990) incorporates a few striking features of actual 
stock market structures, but is designed in a way to reflect “well established stylized 
facts described by such scholars as Keynes, Williams, Black or DeLong et al., and by 
expert market players like Ney” (Day and Huang, 1990: 323). Not only are the 
assumptions plausible, the model also generates data that reflect the real world (i.e. 
erratic fluctuations, switching bull and bear markets and the volume is concentrated at 
the tops and bottoms of these regimes) (Day and Huang, 1990). However, the model 
does not include a needs and social network perspective as we put forth in our 
framework. Including these perspectives in the model by Day and Huang (1990) will 
make it more realistic and we expect to generate more plausible price dynamics with 
an adapted version of the model.  
 
4.2 Future simulations 
 
The first thing that is planned is to try and replicate the results of the Day and Huang 
(1990) study in our own simulation environment. For this, the model of Day and 
Huang will be incorporated in our existing simulation model. In the benchmark 
situation, we will exclude any effect of different needs, social interaction and social 
networks to run the Day and Huang (1990) model in its pure form. Then, we will 
include needs in the model. This will be formalized by adapting the formula for 
investment value of the -investors.  
 
As we assume that satisfying a social need increases the utility of an investment to an 
investor, we will add a term to the formula for investment value that causes the 
investment value to increase as more investors in the social network of the investor in 
question buy the same stock. Off course, investors differ to the extent of perceiving 
this need as an important need. Therefore, we introduce a new parameter S (social 
,-
 at approach, is 
initially normally distributed between 0 and 1, resulting in a heterogeneous 
population of agents. An S value of 0 indicates that an investor only cares about the 
investment value as before in an individual way (i.e. he or she is comparable -
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investor), without any social needs. An S value of 1 indicates that an agent only cares 
%
 -investor, to 
the extent that he or she only takes into account what the market (i.e. the investors 
around him or her) are doing.  
 
The formula for total excess demand will initially be changed according to the 
as   -investors have a S   ! %  -investors have a S  
value of 1. The average S value S, which will be used in the formula is then a 
repre     - % -investors that are in the market. To 
account for the social normative influence, the part of the formula for total excess 
%%%% -investor will now not be dependent on the 
difference between price and average current fundamental value, but on the difference 
between the price and the average current fundamental value of investors’ neighbours 
in the social network (vn).  We assume that the neighbours only have a current 
fundamental value to communicate if and only if they own stocks themselves. Then, 
we can observe that if S = 1 (only social needs), but not a single neighbor of an 
investor owns a stock, this investor won’t buy stocks either. This social influence 
effect will increase in strength as more investors in someone’s social network buy the 
same stock. Therefore, we introduce the parameter xj, the proportion of someone’s 
social network that buys the same stock. The total excess demand function will then 
be: 
 
• E (p) = (1-S) (u-p) f (p) + S (1 + xj) (p – vn) 
 
The first part of this formula, (1-S) (u-  $%% -
like investors. The second part of the formula, S (1 + xj) (p – vn), represents the 
$%% -like investors. The market maker will generate the price in 
the same way as in the standard Day and Huang (1990) model. By including this 
effect in the model we expect to generate more realistic market dynamics than with 
the standard model.  
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Besides the normative influence of investors in a social network, there’s an 
informative component of social network effects. Social networks facilitate the 
exchange of information between investors. This can be information on the long run 
investment value, the current fundamental value or the behaviour of other investors. 
This information can spread in different ways through the network (e.g., reaching a 
random node or a hub) and this is expected to have a different effect on the decision-
making of investors. Besides the information on the behaviour of the other investors, 
there are two pieces of information that are distributed trough the network, i.e. the 
long run investment value u and the current fundamental value among an investor’s 
neighbours (which average is v n). We start the simulations with ‘giving’ all investors 
a different long run investment value u that is normally distributed (e.g., around some 
historical mean) between m and M. Also, a current price p will be set in a random 
fashion between m and M. Lastly, all investors will get a different current 
fundamental value v that will follow a normal distribution (e.g., around some 
historical mean) between m and M. So, a heterogeneous group of investors will result, 
with different values for u and v. After this initialization, we will spread changed 
values of u and v into the network. This represents the changing of opinions among 
investors about the true value of u and v. The spreading process will be carried out in 
different fashions; i.e. giving u or v to a random node, giving u or v to the least 
connected nodes, giving u or v to the main hub (the hub with the largest number of 
outgoing links), giving u or v to another hub, and the like. We expect different 
dynamics for the different ways of spreading this information in the network.  
 
After these runs, we plan to test for the influence of different structures of social 
networks. Different types of social networks (e.g., regular ring network, scale free 
network, random network) are expected to differ with regard to their influence on the 
trading behaviour of the various market participants, as the various network structures 
display different information diffusion characteristics (Cowan and Jonard, 2004). The 
scale free network for example, with its long-distance links and well-connected hubs, 
has proven to be very important for the spreading of behaviour (see e.g., Barabasi, 
2002). Varying the degree of connectivity as well as the number of hubs is expected 
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In this paper, a framework on (private) investor behavior was presented. 
Complementing the views on finance till now, in which scholars assumed that mainly 
risk and return could explain investor behavior, it is argued that also needs, social 
interaction and (social) network effects are key to understanding micro level investor 
behavior and macro level stock market dynamics. In future research, empirical (e.g., 
questionnaires and experiments) and simulation techniques will be combined. In this 
research, the actual needs investors try to satisfy by investing will be brought to light, 
as well as the extent to which social interaction, the use of social information and 
social networks plays a role in their investment decisions. Using simulation 
techniques, the effect of this micro level investor behavior on stock market dynamics 
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